Violence and state (re)formation in the African context: global and local aspects of crisis and change by Abbink, G.J.
Chapter 6
VIOLENCE AND STATE (RE)FORMATION
IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT: GLOBAL AND
LOCAL ASPECTS OF CRISIS AND CHANGE*
Jon Abbink
African Studies Centre
Leiden, and Free University
Amsterdam
INTRODUCTION
Studies of conflict and violence in contemporary Africa or elsewhere are largely
dominated by political science and macro-sociological approaches, often based on théories of
resource compétition (Markakis 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999) and the production of inequality
(Tilly 1998). However, anthropological perspectives are also gaining ground and niake salient
contributions to the field. Understanding transformations of power, conflict and violent
performance demands a multi-disciplinary approach, linking history, social-structural factors,
and cultural dynamics to human agency. As the évidence of most empirical case studies
makes clear, conflict and violence are set in set in wider contexts of global changes in the
international division of labour, world-view discrepancies, and structural inequality of access
to wealth and to the means of survival. While one can ultimately share the view of, e.g.,
evolutionary human biologists and psychologists that 'violence' is a part of the human
disposition and as such inévitable and 'ineradicable', the changing social and cultural
conditions which e,voke or générale aggression and violent performance are as relevant, if not
essential, for an understanding of their nature and their timing.
Some recurring critical questions are the following: why does violence escalate beyond
its inhibiting mechanisms; what are the conditions for its symbolic and/or status-enhancing
appeal; and when is it seen as instrumentally effective or otherwise profitable. These tliree
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éléments relate to the cross-cultural universality of violent performance but are variously
constrained by local developments and contexts.
In line with a redefined, self-critical Enlightenment project (to which I, like Reyna 1994,
Spiro 1996, or Lee 1998, tend to subscribe) seeking to defuse violence as the basis of identity
formation and of institutionalized inequality and power différence, one has therefore to
rethink it, not as an aberration in society but as an integral part of human life exceptional only
when exercised unchecked and with impunity. Crucial is therefore thé study of thé material
conditions and thé concomitant cultural représentations and narratives of human individuals
and groups that enhance a resort to violence, either conscious or unconscious. Thèse spécifie
conditions are thé explanans of thé forms of violence that we see and that we are interested in
as anthropologists. Ultimately, we would perhaps need to combine such institutional théories
about thé conditions and settings under which people act, with those on thé 'psycho-dynamics'
of humans - as performers of violence driven by thé need to résolve the inherent mimetic
rivalry in social life, as described in the thought-provoking work of R. Girard (1977; 1982).
In this chapter, I focus on récent processes of institutional political change, identity
compétition, and state (de/re)formation in the Afhcan context - conditions related to thé
émergence and expression of violence.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The problem of thé relations between violence, warfare and state (re)formation can be
treated on several levels. I will limit my remarks to thé political level, to make a général
argument about 'the African state' and sketch the context and some extraneous connections;
and to thé local, ethnographie level of a small-scale society which sees itself as a distinct
political and cultural community (thé Suri people in Ethiopia). The second level allows me to
study a process of transformation of violence or conflict in a local society in Us emerging
connection to a larger political whole - an African state. (I refer hère to fieldwork carried out
in southem Ethiopia over the last couple of years; see Abbink 1998,2000, 2002.)
Violence lias long been undertheorized in anthropology, but this situation is changing.
Certainly many new studies have appeared recently that enhance our understanding of violent
performance (Linger 1993, Malkki 1995; Hutchinson 1996; Brass 1997; Daniel 1998, Wolf
1998, Heald 1999, Schmidt & Schroeder 2001, cf. also Brandt 2002). Theories on violence as
a social and cultural phenomenon need, however, to combine anthropological with
sociological and historical approaches in more original fashion (cf. Aijmer and Abbink 2000).
Violence I see as thé use of physical, harmful force with thé aim to either intimidate,
enforce dominance or kill others. Warfare is a subset of violence and refers in my view to
massive armed conflict between groups as self-definedpolitical communities: it is collective,
aimed at increasing or monopolizing access to resources of all kinds, at expansion of power of
the community or state, or establishing political and cultural dominance.
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THE GENERAL LEVEL: STATE, SOCIETY
AND VIOLENCE IN AFRICA
In 1998 there were about 200 armed conflicts raging in thé world, and 78 of thèse were in
Afiica: more thari in any other continent. Africa shows deep divisions, many of wnich are
territorial ones. Borders of any kind are now more questioned than ever. If territorial units are
questioned, it fottows that African politics or states are tinder pressure, and borders or
frontiers are being redefined from below on the basis of diverging identity claims and
material inequalities. The disputes over belonging and autochtony are rapidly gaining ground
and form a new discourse of exclusion and opposition. Borders, real or imaginary are forged
through this appeal to violent means. While pre-existing cultural différences enter into play,
these are usually not the explanatory causes of conflict.
African cases indeed figure predominantly in the contemporary discussions of violence
and warfare: the Rwandan genocide, the past destructive conflicts in Mozambique, Liberia,
Somalia, Chad, Burundi, Sierra Leone, or Congo-Brazzaville, the massive war in Angola, the
Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000, the turmoil in the 'Democratie Republic of Congo' (ex-
Zaire) or the continued bloodletting in Southern Sudan. Africa draws persistent media
attention because of the dramatic nature of the violence: stunning, large scale terror and
cruelty which is destroying the social fabric of local societies; the notable involvement of
large numbers of deliberately uprooted youths in the violence; and an apparent absence or
érosion of 'rational' agendas or goals on the part of the warring parties (At least, these are
grossly overestimated in reporting on the violence). Whether Africa has a unique record in
violence is another matter (witoess Tibet since Chinese occupation, Burma, Indonesiaunder
Suharto, Peru, Colombia, Cambodia or the Middle East), but there is a too easily accepted
image of 'barbarism' prevalent in many analyses (akin to the influential Robert Kaplan article
of 1994).
Conflict and violence in Africa are shaped by three 'initial conditions'; 1. the pervasive
héritage of colonial destruction or humiliation of African societies; 2. the inability or
unwillingness of rnost current African élites and leaders - for whatever reason - to construct a
legitimate and inclusive national polity and their resort to sectananism and privileged élite
rule; and 3. the continued subjection of African économies and state policies to dependency
relations with thé developed industrial world. Maneuvering between thé Scylla of blaming thé
West for ail African ills and thé Charybdis of an Afro-pessimism that incorrectly keeps only
thé Africans themselves responsible for thé exercise of violence, thèse above three éléments
form the backstage of any considération of problems of violence on the continent, and explain
part of their spécifie character.
A closer reflection of thé relationship between socio-cultural structure and historical-
material process in Africa reveals that thé pré-colonial political héritage, ethmcity, and thé
transformative political rôle of what is often called in the Afhcan context the 'néo-
patrimonial' postcolony are shaping contemporary violent performance. Below, I discuss
them in turn.
Elements of the pré-colonial cultural and political héritage are often clauned to be still
important in structuring social and political relations. What is the contmuity between past and
present, is there a 'violent héritage' in African political culture, and can it be an explanatory
factor? The French political scientist and Afncamst J.-F. Bayart, m his influential book The
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State in Africa (1993), has overestimated such continuity of the indigenous African political
cultures and bypassed the spécifie historical and cultural dynamics of African countries today.
Some observers of violent conflict have claimed that psycho-cultural or motivational
factors are of gréât Importance. During the Liberian civil war there was much talk of the
combatants using mystical means of war, secret rites and 'witchcraft'. The use of hüman body
parts and blood, for instance, were often mentioned, and indeed confirmed by observers. They
seem to go back to traditional practices of certain secret societies like the Poro. In
Mozambique crude violence was used against civilians and was said to be derived from
'traditional culture' (Wilson 1992). In Southern Africa witchcraft is being revived in some
areas, as a 'modern' response to Community crisis and other perceived threats to individuals. It
leads to the exécution of persons accused as witches. Until very recently, in southern Sudan
certain political leaders - divine kings - were indeed regularly put to death by their subjects
(Simonse 1992), and succession rituals in some Central-African peoples were also violent.
African political culture thus has undeniable éléments of symbolic and actual violence the
images and symbols of which were referred to in to contemporary violence (like political
culture in many other places).
Another element which shaped the nature of power and African political culture and
contained éléments of violent tension was patronage and protection, often enforced. Political
power was not over territories but over people, and ties of personal allegiance and loyalty
were paramount. Tbis blurred the line between institutional power (weak anyhow) and
personal power, and invited arbitrariness in political life and adjudication. Conflicts were
often quickly personalized and acted out violently like a personal battle against enemies. For
instance, when a new male heir ascended to the throne in médiéval Ethiopia, his male agnates
(i.e., his potential cornpetitors) were put in prison for life. In some other countries such royal
rivais were even killed. Needless to say there was great variety across the various régions in
Africa, and modes of indigenous 'constitutionalism' certainly also existed. The forms of
checks and balances that emerged were, however, wiped out by the colonial state. This was
by nature an authoritarian entity and an imposed structure in African life, and not only
reshuffled 'ethnie groups' and "borders' but actively shaped them. The colonial state's roots in
the wider society were tenuous if not absent; and its effect was to create new lines of division,
lts territorial basis was also artificial, its fostering of new (African) elites biased and partial,
lts power was based on coercion, its legitimacy precarious.
The postcolonial state inherited a weak institutional structure, a non-descript 'national'
political identity, and a lop-sided, exploitative economie structure. The political elite that took
over this state did not successfully deal with this héritage and did not succeed in establishing
a wide constituency, a solid economie base, and an inclusive nation-state project. In situations
of scarcity - material and symbolic - it quickly developed a neo-patrimonial practice of
governance, seeing the political as a network of personal links of loyalty, not separating the
access to public economie resources from private use, and narrowing the own constituency to
a régional or 'ethnie' group. Thus, from the start, avenues of advancement were closed and
alternative visions of the national polity suppressed for a large part of the population.
Diversity in class, région and ethnie identity was denied or side-tracked.
Conditions were created for violent self-assertion by the muted voices, because political
parties, protest movements, and civic organizations did not get a chance. Indeed, social
research on Africa has neglected the study of the social bases of politics and efforts at
political reform. The fact that there are no productive middle-classes with any weight and that
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social mobility is very slight inhibits thé establishment of a fïrm institutional basis for a
democracy of couiatervailing powers.
In thé course of thé 1960s, insurgent movements and violent rebellions emerged in thé
postcolonial states. Growing relative resource scarcity, Cold War power politics, dramatic
population growth, economie crisis and ecological pressures fuelled such rebellions.
Systematic néo-patrimonial policies of state elites antagonized large parts of the African
populations and bred violent response to contmued humiliation. Groups revolted out of plain
resentment against the monopolization of national resources through the state machinery.
Some of these movements, like the NPFL in Liberia, the ReNaMo in Mozambique and the
RUF in Sierra Leone in the 1980s and 90s became in themselves deeply violent movements
that lost track of any serious political programme and compromised ends and means. With
systematic terror against civilians and state représentatives they instituted violence as a way
oflife for a whole génération of youths and marginal groups from diverse ethnie backgrounds.
Overseeing all this, it can be said that there was a spécifie kind of cultural patterning of
politics, power and violence in Africa (see also MacGaffey 2000), which has carried over in
the contemporary era. The effects of this may even be remforced, although selectively, by
processes of globalization, where local traditions meet extemally generated forces, objects,
images and ideas, and which are redefined in the process. Globalization is accelerating, and
forces people to face their différences and come to terms with them. This is not a process of
assimilation but of emerging antagonisms.
Most conspicuous in present-day African political culture is the rôle ofethnicity and its
constructions: culture and 'fictive kinship' are turned into a relatively fixed collective identity
on the basis of which social and political claims are made and movements are formed. As we
see, almost daily, the resulting ethnically styled constituencies are very susceptible to
manipulation, including violent action, by old or new elites, but also institute their own
discourse of différence, thereby restructuring social interaction along new lines. These tend to
harden and become the fault-lines of conflict. We can note this, to mention just a few
examples, in the so-called 'tribal conflicts' in Kenya (especially around élection time), in the
violent clashes between ethno-cultoral groups in northern Ghana (Konkomba-Dugumba), in
the past civil war in Congo-Brazzaville, in Nigérian ethno-religious clashes, and in the new
ethnie set-up of politics in Ethiopia. If people believe in the ontological reality of such
constructed lines of différence, then thé stage for violence is set. This is not to say that there is
no substance to cultural différence (language, ritual complexes, moral codes, shared
représentations, etc.) but thé relevant fact is rather that there is no political model to deal with
or accommodate them: they are ordered and evaluated in 'prestige hiérarchies', leading to
patterns of dominance and exclusion. Again, thé political dynamic of the néo-patrimonial
African states plays a crucial catalyzing rôle in this process. It is, in a way, thé équivalent of
thé 'création of différence' described in S. Harrison's interesting monograph on thé Avatip
people in Papua New Guinea (1993).
The African state (colonial and postcolonial), as a political structure insufficiently
connected to or rnandated by society and hovering above it as an exploitative agent, thus
always plays a transformative rôle. It already did so in thé 'contact-settings', when it
forcefully established its authority over previously non-centralized, non-govemed groups both
in the late 19th Century and in thé early decades of independence. The state in Africa was
rarely thé resuit of a 'social contract' between rulers and ruled based on consent. This was




of the state on this continent. Still today the African state is connected to society though its
horizontal networks of patronage and extraction, and commands the means of coercion. But it
has not solidly grounded its hegemony in consent of the populace. lts cultural repertoire is
different, its ways of dealing with citizens - largely fictive concept in itself, as the
bureaucratie means and resources to sustain this identity are lacking for the great majority of
Africans - are often exclusionary. The idea is that power is indivisible. This partly goes back
to traditions of authority among chiefs and kings. In addition, the state's extraneous linkages
to resources outside its territory must neither be underestimated, e.g., with donor-country
institutions, and in international (semi-légal or illégal) trade networks. These linkages have a
great impact on its domestic policy, for instance that towards ethnie or regional groups in
border areas.
EMERGING STRUCTURES OF ANTAGONISM
The African neo-patrimonial state has created a new 'opportumty structure' for violence
as a means for political ends, thus making itself vulnérable to violent subversion. By
'instrumentalizing' inequality, public disorder and the diversity of the constituent parts of the
population - ethnie groups, professional classes, civic organizations, marginal régions - it has
induced a sharpening of social antagonisrns, to thé construction of alternative identities as a
basis for (political) mobilization, and to putting a premium on violent means to achieve ends,
ranging from électoral fraud, intimidation, thé trampling of human rights, and blatant
repression. This happens in conditions of endunng material resource scarcity and growing
économie and environmental insecurity.
While authoritarian elite politics is an héritage of the colonial past, it is not given up by
thé postcolomal state: indeed cannot be given up for fear of loss of power and of access to
economie resources by thé élites. Violence is an inextricable part of the political
instrumentarium of governance.
A remarkable domain of antagonism in contemporary African political discourse is
obviously that of communal identity notions. These have corne to play a key rôle, based on
either ethnie, régional or social characteristics. Increased contacts in thé framework of, first,
colomalism, then within that of thé emerging postcolonial state structures, and subsequently
in that of thé current phase of globalization, have brought out group différences and
confronted them with each other. These 'identities' were initially diffuse and had their roots m
quite diverse moral and cultural Systems, but m situations of compétition (for 'resources' of
any kind, i.e. material or symbolic) thé intensified contacts led to the emphasizing of
différence, not of similarity. In this sensé, violence and ethnicity are closely intertwined, not
because of thé autonomous power of 'ethnie identity1 but because of the latter easily being
appealed to in terras of 'family feeling' and inclusive 'belonging'. hi Somalia for instance, thé
'ethnie' as such was absent but thé constructions of kmship and belonging were structured
around thé clans, which were the units of descent-reckoning through which rights to marriage,
mheritance, or access to collectively held pastures were established. The consistent 'création
of others' in situations of scarcity and duress always tends to lead to patterns of exclusion and
hence to conflict.
In this way, domestic and international factors concur in the African state generating the
conditions of its own démise. The appeal to ethnie or régional constituencies limits thé base
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for its legitimacy, also regarding its use of the monopoly on thé use of violence iand its powers
of taxation and administrative authority, as well as its territoriality and its national 'project.
This process leads to a rethinking of borders, of imagined Community (Benedict Anderson's
concept) and of formulating ideas of 'self-determination's.for theiconstituenfrgroupsl \Vi i ?
Thus, state formation and reformation by means of'violent contestation andi'insurgency
are the almost logical outcome of the emerging antagonisms withinlthe failing state structure
of Africa (witoess Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia after 1991, the émergence lofcEritrea, the
disintegration of ex-Zaire, Sierra Leone). Doubtless, the violence can be seen as a
'constitutive' element in society: it is creating and shaping new forms of (state) brganization,
but not necessarily in a way that enhances legitimacy or grounds a broader constituency.
SOME EXAMPLES: CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE AND ETHIOPIA
As a classic example of a postcolony gone foul one could take Congo-Brazzaville, an ex-
French colony independent since 1960. The colonial state left the country without democratie
institutions, with a top-heavy bureaucracy and a socio-économie structure strongly biased
towards the cities. There was no pan-Congolese identity to speak of. After a long period of
one-party rule, a process of political liberalization started in 1991. But in the course of this,
networks of patronage (based on the distribution of the state's oil revenues) began to shift, and
the newly elected president and the ousted one started to play upon 'ethnie antagonisms'. This
undermined the political arena and the unitary state project (Clark 1998). Political leaders
instituted 'ethnie' militias, subverting the national army, and in 1997 began a destructive four-
month civil war during which opposing new catégories of 'northemers' to 'southerners'
emerged and various ethnie groups came to be pitted against each other. This violence was
repeated in the 1999-2000 clashes. The appeal to violence as a political means led to
abrogation of the constitutional order, to state collapse, and to the émergence of an autocratie
regime based on one ethno-regional constituency. A background factor was the fight over oil
and oil contacts a French Company supported the ousted president (also in his violent
struggle), tliree non-French oil companies had backed the newly elected one, because hè
promised mem access to the rieh Congo oïl-fïelds. The global context thus reveals itself to be
increasingly important.
The case of Ethiopia shows that the colonial héritage is not all determining for the
Problems of African states. The old indigenous Ethiopian empire up to 1974 also showed a
high level of authoritarianism, ethnie heterogeneity, regional favoritism and inequahty, and a
national narrative that did not appeal to all Ethiopians living within the state borders.
Although there had been an ancient state core dating back to the 4th Century, providing a
sense of political identity, the empire expanded by violent means especially in the late 19th
Century, incorporatmg several new ethno-regions. A socialist révolution m 1974 did not lead
to a change m the tenets of the authontanan political culture or the basic structures of
governance. In 1974-91, state violence became the prime political means to enforce a 'new
order'. Political opponents were killed by the thousands m public persécution campaigns like
the 'Red Terror' by the Marxist-Leninist-oriented regime (cf. Abbink 1995). A new regime
that took over in 1991 offïcially instituted 'equality' between the various ethmc-lingmstic
groups and reorganized state policy (éducation, justice, administration, and the provincial
boundanes) accordingly. It led to a highly charged 'ethmcization' of the country's politics and
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to numerous local 'ethnie conflicts', many of them violent. These two successor regimes in
Etliiopia did neither facilitate the émergence of a cross-cutting middle class nor equalize »the
chances of access of ethnic-based or regional groups to resources onsthe level of} the central
state. Regional disparities remained notable, and a politics of (ethnie) exclusion^createdmew
problems after 1991. Indeed, ethno-regional rébellion was partly a responsene the failing
modernization project of the state. The young elites of larger 'ethnie'̂  groups in Ethiopie like
Oromo, Somali and Tigray had rebelled in the 1970s and 1980s because they saw their
régions suffer from economie neglect and cultural discrimination, and themselves being
largely excluded from that modernization drive. The military victory in the civil war in May
1991 was claimed in the name of 'ethnie libération' (by the Tigray TPLF/EPRDF; and in
Eritrea that of 'national libération and unity' by the Eritrean EPLF). After 1991 the state
politics of ethnicity led to heightened consciousness of 'ethnie différence' and thus to new
symbolic boundaries within the mass of the population, many of whom had previously not
primarily thought in ethnie but in regional, religieus or social status terms. Ideological
campaigns of identity création prescribed by ethnie élites, and a new state éducation policy
emphasizing thé own ethno-region and language, started having their effect. They have now
led to new ethnie militancy, to thé rise of new 'ethnie' units (such as the Silt'i people), to
campaigns of économie exclusion, but also to some épisodes of violent ethnie cleansing, with
hundredsofdead.
In thé absence of démocratie opportunities to vent discontent and redress wrongs,
violence remained Ihe subtext of Ethiopian political life. The graduai expansion and
pénétration of thé central state into local societies apparently did not deliver equality or
ground legitimacy but basically amounted to an expansion of surveillance in rural areas.
THE; LOCAL LEVEL: SURI TRANSFORMATIONS
An analysis of the overall conditions of thé génération of violence in Africa proceeds on
a macroscopic, political-historic level, and it cannot tell us how violence and coercion play a
rôle in thé attempted reproduction of state governance and hegemony in society. More
interesting from an anthropological perspective is to see how local societies articulate with
thé political mechanîsms and coercive policies of the African state: how are thèse relations
constituted and acted out, and what rôle does violence play in it? Such linkages are being
more and more studied in current research; one good example is thé monograph on thé Nuer
of Southern Sudan, by S. Hutchmson (1996).
Local-level studies often show that the entrance of the state in local societies did not
eradicate violence but changed its nature and scope. While local societies (e.g., neighboring
pastoral societies raiding each other) were not unfamiliar with 'violence', it was often not seen
as a 'problem' : its scale and its effects were more or less predictable, and contained in shared
codes of fighting (in raiding) and m ritual reconciliations. 'External factors' like state action,
régional wars, or new technology can often change such a state of affairs. The case of the Suri
agro-pastoralists in Ihe Sudanese-Ethiopian border area (a group of about 24,000 people)
shows how thé confrontation of state and society articulâtes différent cultural commitments,
créâtes antagonisms, and transforms thé nature of violence. It illustrâtes thé problematic
reproduction of stale authority in a différent cultural setting and reveals thé socially
reordering force of violence.
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I limit myself to the last phase of state impact, that of the post 1991-regime, because
compared to previous types of govemment, the impact of the current EPRDF-administration
on the Suri seems to have been greatest. Historically, the Ethiopian state (present in their area
since c. 1898) was never seen by the Suri as a normative agent with which a mutually
bénéficiai relationship could be established. It had manifested itself first in military form, and
its activities over the years were marked by the exercise of punitive violence in the
maintenance of public order and in tax extraction. In Suri society violence was not scarce, but
it was somehow 'contained'. Young men become adults while committed to herding the cattle
and defending it against raiding outsiders. On this basic level - i.e. that of their mode of
subsistence and of 'compétition for resources' - the readiness to confront and use violence
(repulsing and/or killing raider-enemies) was an essential requirement of the Suri way of life,
and not seen in any sense as problematic or contested. This cattle-herding, requiring mobility,
decentralized organization and a 'warrior ethos' or militancy, also correlated with a 'culture of
personal achievement', expressed in songs and stories about exploits and défense of the herds,
battle and the identification with a 'favorite' stock animal. It also included killing big game
predators or human enemies. Such a killing was symbolically given récognition by applying a
prestigieus skin scarification and in songs by âge mates. For the formation of the Suri social
persona, clan identity and age-grades play a defïning rôle (of the latter, being a form of
'fraternal interest group', it is predicted in the literature that it correlates with a relatively high
level of violence).
Suri violence could be said to move between the two pôles of ritual Containment and
political strategy. (cf. Abbink 1998.) The former element was related to keeping a kind of
equilibrium in their own society, the latter for the défense of livestock herds and safeguarding
access natural resources vis-à-vis different pastoralist and agricultural neighbors.
In 1991, when the new Ethiopian state entered the scène, this pattern changed. It was a
time when local conflict between the Suri and their four neighboring groups were under
pressure. There were population movements, more pressure on natural resources, and an
influx of new automatic weapons since the mid-1980s that altered the exercise of violence
itself (more victims, more robbery, raids and ambushes, and a décline in trans-group trade and
contacts). The Ethiopian state authorities now linked the exercise of Suri 'external' violence
towards their neighbors to presumed violent practices within their own society, such as
frequent animal sacrifice in the context of reconciliation ceremonies and cérémonial stick
dueling, both very cherished cultural practices that 'ordered' local Suri society. The
govemment tried to discourage these practices in the hope that this would also reduce the Suri
resorting to violence in their dealings with other groups (sedentary peasants and pastoralists).
This became the issue of a major debate: the Suri contested the interprétation that sacrifice
and dueling were Violent' or a *bad custom', and they did not give them up. At the same time,
the govemment tried - predictably - to disarm the Suri. This did not work due to all kinds of
practical reasons, and due to obstinate refusai of Suri to cooperate. They knew that handing in
weapons would make them vulnérable to neighboring groups (partly living in Sudan) that did
not hand in their weapons, and from which the state could not protect them (cf. Abbink 2000).
The govemment policy after 1991 also included the installation of a new local Suri
Council for 'self-government', to make people more responsible in dealing with their own
Problems. This whole process of state co-optation of the Suri, however, was ultimately not
successful. Violent incidents did not diminish. Indeed, in the years after 1991 the Suri had
some of their most violent confrontations with both their Dizi and Anyuak neighbors and with
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the state. A series of incidents in late 1993 of Suri attacking Dizi, and, more importantly,
killing some government soldiers finally led to a massive retaliatory action by the latter. In
this confrontation (late October 1993), whereby hand grenades were used, it is estimated (hat
a few hundred Suri died, mainly women and children. Smaller incidents followed in
subséquent years.
There is no doubt that conflicts of the Suri with other ethnie groups in their vicinity were
in part a continuation of long-standing structural problems: increasing resource compétition,
droughts, problems of cattle disease. But the meeting of state and Suri itself was also a
contributory factor: it was based on false premises and cultural misconceptions (see Abbink
2000) and led to growing antagonism. The Suri retain their ingrained notion of the
encroaching Ethiopian state - whatever its nature - as an imposition and a threat. They see that
the state at crucial moments reserves the right to use massive force, while faüing to assist
them in resolving long-standing economie problems or disputes with neighboring groups. The
Suri also have a politica! model of authority and decision-making that does not sit well with
the ultimately authoritarian model of the state, which is not seen as adequate for local
conditions. The also see the state dominated by people 'not of their own', with their own
agenda.
CONCLUSION
A first point to emphasize is that African state formation was and remains incomplete,
and largely unsuccessful. The colonial rupture in many respects prevented a graduai évolution
of new forais of governance and authority from the old. Secondly, African regime politics
tends to be elitist, exploitative and divisive. It produces antagonisms and identity compétition.
There is no inclusive project of citizenship and sharing. The néo-patrimonial System of
politics is incapable of incorporating local society except by coercion and force, often crade
violence. In this, thé African state expérience, though much more compressed in time, shares
many traits with thé long process of state-making in Europe as 'organized crime1: instrumental
use of violence, war-making, resource extraction, and enforced 'protection' (Tilly 1985). In
this expérience, local societies were not "partners' in an unfolding 'social contract', but simply
losers. The Suri expérience in Ethiopia seems to underline this: it is thé record of a, so far,
unsuccessful médiation, marked by a violent subtext.
Thirdly, African social structures, ethnie communities and modes of govemance in the
post-colonial era are not congruent, and they are not really in thé process of becoming so.
There is an econoinically and politically fuelled process of division and indeed of
instrumentalization of disorder (Chabal & Daloz 1999) going on which cames a high conflict
potential. Violence remains a widespread political means that elites and power holders can
and do resort to without hésitation if their position is at stake. The global international system
that props up their position largely aids and abets them, and has no other solutions ready.
Fourth, thé remarks above imply that African states as we know them do not create an
inclusive political arena or give sufficient autonomous space for indigenous political
responses. They tend to contribute to thé reproduction of structures of inequality, insecurity
and often criminalization. This, incidentally, is where the globalization factor cornes in.
Africa and especially its élites are part of a globalizing world arena: it is not left alone and its
processes of state (re)formation, conflict and warfare do not develop as they did in Europe,
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over a period of hundreds of years and with a more or less autonomous logic of compétition
and internally generated economie accumulation (Tilly 1985). African state elites are co-
opted and supported by their extractive contacts with the developed countries and by their
insertion into the current world of interconnecting elites and interest groups. This new global
domain not only enhances politica! survival stratégies of the elites in place, but also has a
wider cultural impact, fostering images and ideals of unscrupulous compétition, showing-off,
real or symbohc conquest, and violent performance. This can be seen in the exercise of power
itself and in the compétitive traffic and display of consumer products as signs of new wealth
and status. They create their own market, and the wish to possess them, or to use and abuse
them, is spreadmg, also in Africa. Initially, in non-industrial societies without many
resources, that wish is mostly detached from the possibilities to acquire them (money,
contacts, location). Violent appropriation is then the most powerful means to bridge this gap
and acquire them. But African countries remain marginal in this quest, except for their elites,
which can be exceedingly nch. It is partly the rébellion agamst the element of 'structural
violence' m global relations - power différence, economie exploitation, development
paternahsm, consumerism, exposure to foreign mass média products, and contmued
dévaluation of thé viability of indigenous traditions - that keeps generating violence in
contemporary African societies. This is a structural aspect of evolving political-global
relations that has not worked towards meamngful development or rehabilitation of damage
done m the past. Hence violence will not soon decrease but hkely become a more général
practice, more 'democraùzed', and entrenchmg itself as an option available to more and more
groups - ethnie, régional, religious or otherwise -, mus becoming part of the 'life-world' of
commumties. It is also much different from past practices because fuelled much more by
current patterns o f (failmg) state governance and continuing hegemonism. Violence is often
both a protest against state elites as well as a way to alternative self-assertion, thus reflecting
persistent divisions between state and society in Afhca.
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